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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
Toni LeClercq appeals from the judgment entered upon her conditional
guilty plea to misdemeanor DUI. Specifically, LeClercq challenges the order
denying her motion to suppress evidence.
Statement of Facts and Course of Proceedings
The state charged LeClercq with misdemeanor DUI. (R., p. 5.) Part of the
state's probable cause was a breath alcohol test of .141/.143 percent. (R., p. 7.)
LeClercq filed a motion in limine and an amended motion in limine and/or motion
to suppress breath alcohol testing evidence. (R., pp. 10-11; 14-15.) After a
hearing, the magistrate found that the officer attempted to stop LeClercq for
speeding; LeClercq did not immediately stop but instead crossed over a doubleyellow line; after managing the stop the officer smelled a strong odor alcohol from
the vehicle and from LeClercq; LeClercq was "alternately confused, apologetic,
argumentative and unable to find the appropriate information for the officer"; and
that LeClercq admitted to drinking wine and failed the HGN and one leg stand
field sobriety tests. (R., pp. 56-57.) The officer explained to LeClercq he would
use a portable breath machine to test her breath alcohol concentration after a
fifteen minute waiting period. (R., p. 58.) During that time, LeClercq asked three
times if she could refuse the test. (Id.) The magistrate found that:
The first time, [the officer] told her to first listen to the advisory form.
The second time he told her "You can refuse, but I would take you
to the hospital and we would do a forced blood draw" and went on
to explain that Idaho state law said he could forcibly take her blood
if she did not submit to the breath sample because of the implied

consent law. The third time, he again stated that he would take her
to the hospital for blood; that she would receive a refusal; and that
her license would be lost for one year.
(R., p. 58.) The magistrate concluded that the officer's actions were permissible
and denied the motion to suppress. (R., pp. 56-62.) The parties reached a plea
agreement whereby LeClercq entered a conditional guilty plea, preserving her
right to appeal the denial of her motion to suppress. (R., pp. 71-77.)

The

magistrate entered a withheld judgment against LeClercq. (R., p. 77.) LeClercq
appealed and the district court affirmed the magistrate's decision. (R., pp. 81-82;
130.) LeClercq timely appealed the district court's decision. (R., pp. 135-137.)

ISSUE

LeClercq did not set forth a concise statement of the issues on appeal.
The state asserts the issue on appeal as:
Has LeClercq failed to demonstrate error in the denial of her motion to
suppress the results of her alcohol breath test?

ARGUMENT
LeClercq Has Failed To Demonstrate Error In The District Court's Denial Of Her
Motion To Suppress
A.

Introduction
LeClercq claims that her consent to breath alcohol testing was not

voluntary because the officer informed her that he would have a blood sample
taken if she did not consent to the breath test. (Appellant's brief, pp. 5-17.)
LeClercq's argument fails for three reasons.

First, because LeClercq gave

implied consent her actual consent (and the voluntariness thereof) is irrelevant to
the admissibility of the breath testing. Second, because the officer's statement
that he would pursue an involuntary blood draw was within the scope of the
officer's constitutionally available investigative methods, his statements to her
that he would pursue such further investigation if LeClercq refused was not
constitutionally coercive.

Finally, LeClercq's reliance on Idaho statutes

governing refusals is misplaced because she did not refuse. LeClercq has failed
to demonstrate that the district court erred in affirming the magistrate's decision
denying her motion to suppress.
B.

Standard Of Review
On review of a decision rendered by a district court in its intermediate

appellate capacity the reviewing court "directly review[s] the district court's
decision." State v. DeWitt, 145 Idaho 709, 711, 184 P.3d 215, 217 (Ct. App.
2008) (citing Losser v. Bradstreet, 145 Idaho 670, 183 P.3d 758 (2008)). The
appellate court "examine[s] the magistrate record to determine whether there is

substantial and competent evidence to support the magistrate's findings of fact
and whether the magistrate's conclusions of law follow from those findings."

Id.

"If those findings are so supported and the conclusions follow therefrom and if
the district court affirmed the magistrate's decision, [the appellate court] affirm[s]
the district court's decision as a matter of procedure."

(citing Losser, 145

ldaho at 670; Nicholls v. Blaser, 102 ldaho 559, 633 P.2d 1137 (1981)). "The
standard of review of a suppression motion is bifurcated. When a decision on a
motion to suppress is challenged, we accept the trial court's findings of fact that
are supported by substantial evidence, but we freely review the application of
constitutional principles to the facts as found." State v. Faith, 141 ldaho 728,
729-730, 117 P.3d 142, 143-144 (Ct. App. 2005). Conclusions of law are subject
to free review. Riley v. Rowan, 131 ldaho 831, 833, 965 P.3d 191, 193 (1998).
C.

LeClercq Has Failed To Demonstrate Error In The District Court's
Appellate Ruling On The Denial Of Her Motion To Suppress
LeClercq has failed to establish that the district court erred in upholding

the magistrate court's decision denying her motion to suppress.

LeClercq's

breath test results were admissible pursuant to Idaho's implied consent statute
and were not the product of unconstitutional police coercion.
The administration of an alcohol concentration test is a seizure of the
person and a search for evidence under the Fourth Amendment of the U.S.
Constitution.

Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 767 (1966); State v.

DeWitt, 145 ldaho 709, 711-712, 184 P.3d 215, 217-218 (Ct. App. 2008).
However, alcohol concentration testing pursuant to Idaho's implied consent

statute is a well-recognized exception to the general rule that searches and
seizures conducted without a warrant are presumptively unreasonable. DeWitt,
145 ldaho at 712, 184 P.3d at 218; See also State v. Diaz, 144 ldaho 300, 160
P.3d 739 (2007); State v. Nickerson, 132 ldaho 406, 410, 973 P.2d 758, 762 (Ct.
App. 1999); I.C. § 18-8002(1).
Under ldaho law, there is no legal right to refuse an alcohol concentration
test when there are reasonable grounds for the request and the test is conducted
in a reasonable manner. State v. Harmon, 131 ldaho 80, 952 P.2d 402 (1998).
Even if the defendant is not notified of the consequences of refusal as required
by I.C.

5

18-8002(3) the results of the evidentiary test will be admissible in a

criminal prosecution.

Id.,131 ldaho at 85, 952 P.2d at 407.

The failure to advise

a suspect of the consequences of refusal would be significant only with respect
to the administrative,license suspension following a refusal. State v. DeWitt, 145
ldaho 709, 184 P.3d 215, n. 4 (Ct. App. 2008). In fact, ldaho courts have long
recognized that while a driver has no legal right to refuse testing, the legislature
enacted the license suspension statute in recognition of a driver's physical ability
to refuse to submit to a breath test and that the statute was designed to
discourage and civilly penalize such a refusal. DeWitt, 145 ldaho at 713, 184
P.3d at 219 (citing State v. Woolerv, 116 ldaho 368, 775 P.2d 1210 (1989).)
In State v. Nickerson, 132 ldaho 406, 973 P.2d 758 (Ct. App. 1999), a
case similar to LeClercqls case, the defendant was told that because he was on
parole he could not refuse the breath alcohol test and that if he refused he would
go back to prison; the defendant argued that these comments were coercive and

rendered his consent to a breath alcohol test involuntary. The Idaho Court of
Appeals rejected this argument stating that the "argument that his consent to the
BAC at the police station was involuntary is of no consequence because he had
impliedly consented as a matter of law."

Id.,132 Idaho at 410, 973 P.2d at 762.

The court went on to note that "although an individual has the physical ability to
prevent a test, there is no legal right to withdraw the statutorily implied consent."
Id. The court concluded that "consent at the police station, whether voluntary or
involuntary, is superfluous, for actual consent at that point is unnecessary to the
lawfulness of the procedure or the admissibility of the test results."
LeClercq's argument on appeal is that the breath test results should have
been suppressed because the implied consent statute does not specifically
authorize telling a DUI suspect "that blood will be forcibly drawn" and if an officer
"makes that type of threat" the breath test is "coerced, and the results should be
suppressed." (Appellant's brief, p. 6.)

Because the question of coercion is

legally irrelevant when the breath test is the result of implied consent, Nickerson,
132 Idaho at 410, 973 P.2d at 762, this argument fails.
Even if LeClercq's consent argument were legally relevant, it still fails
because she has failed to show that any actual consent was the result of
coercion. As the magistrate correctly noted in this case, to reach the conclusion
proposed by LeClercq the court "would have to determine that if you are given a
choice of two tests and you take the first, the evidence is suppressible, but if you
take the second, it is not suppressible. Logically, either both are suppressible or
neither is suppressible. Consistent with Diaz, neither is suppressible." (R., p. 60

(citing State v. Diaz, 144 ldaho 300, 160 P.3d 739 (2007)).)

By informing

LeClercq of his intent to follow a valid and allowable course of investigation if she
refused to cooperate with the breath test required by her implied consent, the
officer did not coerce her consent - he merely gave her the choice of two
perfectly legal means by which he would acquire the evidence to which the state
was entitled.
Merely informing a suspect that the officer intends to pursue a legal
means of obtaining evidence if consent is not granted does not coerce consent.
State v. Garcia, 143 ldaho 774, 152 P.3d 645 (2006). In Garcia, the defendant
moved to suppress evidence obtained in a search of his vehicle. Garcia, 143
ldaho 774, 152 P.3d 645.

He claimed that his consent to search was not

voluntary because the officer had threatened to arrest him based on probable
cause existing before the search.

(Id.) The Court of Appeals disagreed, stating

that:
bowing to events, even if one is not happy about them, is not the
same as being coerced. The voluntariness of consent is not
impaired simply because one is faced with two unpleasant choices,
which here, Garcia argues, was choosing between consenting to
the search and allowing the marijuana in his truck to be discovered
and not consenting and risking arrest of himself and his
companions.
Garcia, 143 ldaho at 779, 152 P.3d at 650. The court further explained that an
officer's implied or explicit offer not to arrest someone if he "turns over what he
has" is not coercive if it merely "informs the suspect of the officer's intention to do
something that is within the officer's authority based on the circumstances."
Garcia, 143 ldaho at 779-780, 152 P.3d at 650-651.

Because the officers

actually had probable cause to arrest Garcia, the statement was an informational
communication regarding authority the officers actually possessed and "did not
ips0 facto render Garcia's consent involuntary." Garcia, 143 ldaho at 780, 152
P.3d at 649.
In this case it is undisputed that the officer had probable cause to request
alcohol testing from LeClercq.

(a
qenerallv, Appellant's brief.)

Therefore, the

officer's statements to her that he could obtain a blood sample if she did not give
a breath test were statements communicating authority that the officer actually
possessed.

See

State v. Diaz, 144 ldaho 300, 160 P.3d 739 (2007); State v.

Worthinnton, 138 ldaho 470, 65 P.3d 21 1 (Ct. App. 2002). As in Garcia, the fact
that LeClercq was faced with two unpleasant choices did not impair the
voluntariness of her decision and the statements by the officer did not ipso facto
render her consent involuntary. In short, the statements made by the officer
were not coercive in the constitutional sense.

See State v. Smith, 144 ldaho 482,

488-89, 163 P.3d 1194, 1200-01 (2007) (officer's statement of intent to seek
search warrant not coercive where not false statement of authority to obtain
warrant); State v. Ballou, 145 ldaho 840, 848-49, 186 P.3d 696, 704-05 (Ct. App.
2008) (officer's statement of intent to get warrant if consent not granted not
coercive where officer had probable cause and could have obtained search
warrant).
Finally, LeClercq's argument fails because it is ultimately unsupported by
the authority she relies upon. For example, LeClercq's reliance upon cases
involving civil administrative license suspensions to support her position is

misplaced.

(SeeAppellant's brief, pp. 7-10 (citing Matter of McNeel~,119 ldaho

182, 804 P.2d 911 (Ct. App. 1990); Matter of Virqil, 126 ldaho 946, 895 P.2d 182
(Ct. App. 1995); Matter of Beem, 119 ldaho 289, 805 P.2d 495 (1991).) A driver
has no legal right to refuse testing; the legislature enacted the license
suspension statute in recognition of a driver's physical ability to refuse to submit
to a breath test and that the statute was designed to discourage and civilly
penalize such a refusal. DeWitt, 145 ldaho at 713, 184 P.3d at 219 (citing State
v. Woolery, 116 ldaho 368, 775 P.2d 1210 (1989).) The failure to properly
advise a suspect of the consequences of refusal is significant only with respect
to the administrative license suspension following a refusal. State v. DeWitt, 145
ldaho 709, 184 P.3d 215, n. 4 (Ct. App. 2008). Even if the defendant is not
properly notified of the consequences of refusal as required by I.C. § 18-8002(3)
the results of the evidentiary test will be admissible in a criminal prosecution.
State v. Harmon, 131 ldaho 80, 85, 952 P.2d 402, 407 (1998).
Likewise, LeClercqls reliance on case law from Texas and Colorado is
misplaced. (Appellant's brief, pp. 11-15 (citing Erdman v. State, 861 S.W.2d
890, 893 (Tx. App. 1993); Turbyne v. People, 151 P.3d 563 (Colo. 2007).)
Colorado law has an express consent law which gives persons suspected of
driving under the influence additional rights that they do not have in Idaho,
including the right to choose the method of testing. Turbvne, 151 P.3d at 568.
Where a defendant chose the blood test, Colorado's express consent law "did
not authorize the arresting officer to require Turbyne to take a breath test . .. ."
Turbyne, 151 P.3d at 571. Thus, suppression of the breath test was required

because the officer's threat of a license suspension for not cooperating with the
breath test was illegitimate. Turbvne, 151 P.3d at 571-72.
Similarly, under Texas law, if a person suspected of driving under the
influence refuses an evidentiary test, "none shall be taken." Erdman v. State,
861 S.W.2d 890, 893 (Tx. App. 1993). Under Texas law, "a suspect's refusal to

Id.

provide a breath sample must be strictly honored."

Thus, even true

statements that exert "psychological pressure" to submit to the test violate the
Texas statute and require suppression of the evidence.

Id.at 893-94.

These cases from Colorado and Texas, therefore, were interpreting far
different statutes than are before this Court. What constitutes a violation of
those statutes -- refusing to honor the suspect's choice of tests and applying
pressure when the suspect enjoys the right to absolutely refuse testing - is
simply inapplicable here because the Idaho statute confers no such rights on
LeClercq.
LeClercq has failed to show error in the denial of her motion to suppress
the results of her breath test. The officer's statements were irrelevant to her
implied consent. Even if relevant the statements did not amount to improper
coercion. Finally, LeClercq's authority is irrelevant as it goes to either the license
suspicion for a refusal (which did not happen in this case) or to the allowability of
police conduct under statutes very different from Idaho's.

CONCLUSION
The state respectfully requests this Court affirm the district court's order
denying LeClercq's motion to suppress and affirm her judgment of conviction.
DATED this 9th day of June 2010.
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